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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a decree of divorce and division of marital property in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County; the Honorable Frank G. Noel
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(h)(1996).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Does the evidence support the trial court's factual finding that Appellee

did not commingle his inheritance funds with marital funds, when those funds were
used for family expenses, held in an account which also contained other marital
funds, and when Appellee testified that he had no intention of keeping the
inheritance funds as his separate property?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's findings of fact under a
"clearly erroneous" standard. See Utah R. Civ Proc. 52(a). Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous when they are "contrary to the clear weight of the evidence" or if this Court has
a firm conviction that a mistake was made. D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 354 (Utah
App. 1992) (citation omitted). An appellant must marshall all the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings, and then demonstrate to this Court why the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the trial court's conclusions. See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d
73, 79 (Utah App. 1991).
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2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to include the value of

Appellee's inheritance funds and proceeds from selling his Carbon County property
as part of the marital estate, and failing to award half of that value to Appellant,
when Appellee used these assets to pay for marital expenses and purchase property
for the marital estate, and where the evidence shows Appellee made a gift of those
assets to the marital estate?
Standard of Review: As suggested above, the division of marital property is
reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. See, e.g., Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874
P.2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 1994).
By an "abuse of discretion" . . . "is meant a clearly erroneous conclusion and
judgment - one that is clearly against the logic and the effect of such facts as are
presented in support of the application, or against the reasonable and probable
deductions to be drawnfromthe facts disclosed upon the hearing . . . ft is a legal term to
indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was a commission of error of
law in the circumstances."

Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State
v. Draper, 83 Utah 115, 143, 27 P.2d 39, 49-50 (1933) (further citations omitted)). When
a party claims that the trial court has abused its discretion by failing to apply the law or
mistaking the law, this Court wteview[s] using a correction of error standard, giving no
deference to the tribunal's legal determination." Id. at 27.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND COURT RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1999). Disposition of property . . .
(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable

orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties . . .
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all action tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .
.. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Beverly Sue Arnason, Defendant/Appellant, brings this appeal from a decree of
divorce and division of marital property entered by The Honorable Frank G. Noel, Third
District Judge.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History
1.

Appellant Beverly Sue Arnason and Appellee David Arnason were married

on August 26, 1983. The parties became increasingly estranged during the course of their
marriage, and separated in approximately April 1997. See Record at 10. The parties had
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three children during their marriage. However, the custody of the children is not at issue
in this appeal.
2.

Appellee is a beneficiary of the Fern F. Arnason Family Trust, which

consists of money saved by Appellee's mother and late father. Appellee also received
funds from the Arnason Family Partnership, which is a partnership between Appellee's
mother and Appellee and his siblings. From 1982-1996, Appellee received approximately
$130,246 from the trust and partnership (these funds are referred to in this brief as
Appellee's "inheritance"). These funds were dispersed to Appellee by checks from his
mother. Record at 78, In. 16-24; 79, 16-25; 80, In. 1-16; 49, In. 12-22.
3.

During their marriage, the parties purchased a home in Midvale (referred to

as the "Sandy" home). This was the family home for the latter part of the marriage.
Appellee made a $47,527 down payment on the home, using inheritance funds. The
parties also owned a home in Salt Lake City, which was the family home before they
purchased the Sandy home. Appellee testified that "[t]he majority of the funds [for
purchasing the Salt Lake home] came from my mother's estate." Appellee also paid the
down payment and costs for improvements to the Salt Lake home with inheritance funds.
The total of these costs was $74,807. Record at 9, In. 15-18; 26, In. 15-22; 52, In. 10-12;
28, In. 6-11; 31, In. 24-25; 32, In. 1-4, 17-25.
4.

Appellee admitted during direct examination that the inheritance funds were

deposited "[m]ostly in our joint checking account, me and Beverly's [sic] joint checking
account. But she, at one point, got her own checking account and we stopped co-
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mingling our funds at that point." Appellee also made a practice of depositing money
from his paycheck into the same credit union account that held his inheritance funds.
Appellee used funds from this account to pay for a Buick Park Avenue that was jointly
titled in the names of Appellee and Appellant. The Buick was the family car, used for
family matters and obligations. Record at 32, In. 1-9; 55, In. 1-17; 56, 20-23; 57, In. 1015.
5.

Appellee testified that he began keeping his inheritance funds in his

individual account at the credit union, and that "I kept the money sheltered so that we
could get, we could use the money instead of having it go to credit card debt." He
admitted that he did not intend to keep the inheritance funds, nor the value of the family
homes, as his separate, individual property. Regarding his use of inheritance funds for
family and marital purposes, Appellee testified that, "It was my intention to provide for
my family." Record at 65, In. 15-25; 66, In. 21-25; 67, In. 1-7.
6.

Appellee owned a home in Carbon County, which he purchased before his

marriage to Appellant. In 1996, Appellee sold the home for $21,000. Appellee used
$20,000 of the proceeds from this sale to pay the mortgage on the parties' home in Sandy.
Appellee used the other $1,000 "for just [sic] expenses of the household." Record at 29,
In. 5-6, 11-15; 70, In. 25; 71, In. 1.
7.

Appellee filed for divorce on or about May 5, 1997. Appellant filed an

answer and counterclaim in June 1997. After lengthy discovery, and several pretrial
motions and orders regarding child custody and other matters, trial held on April 19, 1999
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before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Third District Judge. At the conclusion of the trial,
Judge Noel ruled on the issues of child custody, division of property, and decree of
divorce. The decree of divorce was granted. Record at 141, In. 11-15. (The divorce
decree was entered on May 19, 1999.) As noted above, the child custody determination is
not at issue in this appeal.
8. The trial court also found that Appellee's inheritance funds remained his
separate property throughout the marriage, despite the evidence that he used those funds
for marital and family purposes during his marriage to Appellant. Record at 141, In. 2125; 142, In. 1-16. The trial court also found that Appellee's intent in so using his
inheritance funds was "not crucial to its findings." Record at 142, In. 19-20. Thus,
evidence that Appellee intended to use his inheritance funds to provide for his family was
entirely excluded from the trial court's disposition on this issue. Record at 142, In. 20-25;
143, In. 1-3. The trial court also found that the $20,000 in proceeds from the sale of
Appellee's Carbon County home was his separate property, and credited Appellee with
the value of those proceeds and the value of the inheritance funds Appellee used for
marital expenses. Record at 144, In. 19-22; 146, In. 10-12; 147, In. 23-25. Pursuant to
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the court ordered counsel for
Appellee to draft Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with these findings.
A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce are
included in the Addendum to this brief.
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9.

The findings summarized above in paragraph 8 are disputed by Appellant.

Notice of Appeal was filed on June 7, 1999. As required by Rule 28 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the parties attended a mediation conference on July 27, 1999.
However, the parties were unable to resolve the issues that now come before this Court.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court made a factual finding that Appellee's inheritance funds were not
commingled with the marital estate. This finding was clearly erroneous, considering the
evidence presented to the trial court. The evidence presented at trial, mainly through
Appellee's testimony, shows that Appellee made a practice of commingling his
inheritance funds with marital funds (i.e., money that was used for marital and family
purposes). Appellee used inheritance funds to pay for marital/family expenses, and
testified that it was not his intent to keep these funds as his separate property. As
Appellee testified, it was intent to use these funds to provide for his family. Because the
trial court's findings regarding this issue were clearly erroneous and against the weight of
the evidence, its findings must be reversed.
Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence
regarding Appellee's intent to use the inheritance funds for marital and family purposes.
Case law from this Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and courts from other jurisdictions
show that a party's intent in using his separate property as if it were the couple's is one of
the determinative factors a court should consider when deciding whether a spouse's
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separate, individual property has become part of the marital estate. In the present case,
the evidence of Appellee's intent and practice of using his so-called "separate property"
for marital and family purposes plainly show that he made a gift of that property to the
marital estate. The value of those gifts should have been included in the trial court's
determination of the value and division of marital property.
Judge Noel explicitly stated that he was disregarding evidence of Appellee's intent
to use his inheritance as part of the marital estate, even though it is common practice in
Utah and the majority of jurisdictions to consider such evidence when ruling on the issues
presented to the trial court. The trial court should be reversed for this abuse of discretion.
The trial court further abused its discretion by failing to award Appellant her
equitable share in the full value of the marital estate. Utah law presumes that Appellant is
entitled to fifty percent of the value of the marital estate. Because the trial court did not
include the value of Appellee's inheritance funds, the marital estate, and therefore
Appellant's award of marital property, was substantially undervalued. The trial court's
division of property should be reversed.
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to include, as part of the
marital estate, the value of proceeds from the sale of Appellee's real property in Carbon
County. The evidence at trial showed that although the home was originally Appellee's
separate property, Appellee used the proceeds from the sale of this property to pay a
mortgage on the parties' home and to pay other marital expenses. Case law decided by
this Court clearly shows that when a spouse's separate property is consumed or
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commingled for marital purposes, or given as a gift to the marital estate, the value of that
property becomes part of the marital property. The trial court did not follow this Court's
guidelines on these issues, and the trial court's failure to include the value of those
proceeds in the property division should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLEE'S INHERITANCE
FUNDS WERE NOT COMMINGLED WITH MARITAL FUNDS IS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE

A. Division of Marital Property And Commingling of Gifts and Inheritances
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1999), trial courts have the power to make
equitable distributions of marital property in divorce actions. "[MJarital property
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever
obtained and from whatever source derived . . . " Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,
1079 (Utah 1988) (quoting Englert v. Englert 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978)). Generally,
trial courts award property acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse during the
marriage to the spouse who received it. See Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530,
535 (Utah App. 1990). However, the other spouse will acquire an equitable interest in the
gift or inheritance when the other spouse contributes to the maintenance or enhancement
of that property, or when "the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse had made a gift of an interest in
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the property to the other spouse." Id. (quoting Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,
308 (Utah 1988)).
Mortensen is the leading Utah case on these issues. Prior to that decision, there
was no definitive Utah case law outlining how courts should treat property that had come
to one spouse through gift or inheritance during the marriage. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at
306-7. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court relied on precedent from other jurisdictions.
A review of the law in other jurisdictions discloses that generally property acquired by
one spouse by gift or inheritance during the marriage is awarded wholly to that spouse
upon divorce .. .[unless the other spouse has] acquire[ed] an equitable interest in it.
The rule that property acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should be awarded to
that spouse on divorce unless the other spouse has, by his or her efforts with regard to the
property, acquired an equity in it does not apply when the property thus acquired is
consumed, such as when a gift or an inheritance of money is used for family purposes, In
re Marriage of Metcalf, [598 P.2d 1140 (Mont. 1979)]; when the property completely
loses its identity and is not traceable because it is commingled with other property
(sometimes called transmuted)... or when the acquiring spouse places title in their joint
names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property. Hussey v.
Hussey, [312 S.E.2d 267 (S.C. App. 1984)]. See also Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk,
[325 N.W.2d 832 (Neb. 1982)]...
Id. at 307. The Utah Supreme Court then adopted this rule.
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making "equitable property division pursuant to
[Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5] should, in accordance with the rule prevailing in most other
jurisdictions and with the division made in many of our own cases, generally award
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage . . . to that
spouse .. .unless . . . the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchange or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest
therein to the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson v. Jespersoo, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).

Id. at 308. Thus, a trial court should consider the value of one spouse's gifts or
inheritance to be part of the marital estate when a gift or inheritance is used for family
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purposes, when the inheritance is commingled with other marital property so that it is no
longer clear what property is individual and what part is joint, or where the spouse
receiving the inheritance uses the property in a way that shows an intention of making it
marital property. "Premarital property may lose its separate distinction where the parties
have inextricably commingled it into the marital estate or where one spouse has
contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d
1314, 1321 (Utah App. 1990).

B. Standard of Review for Findings of Fact
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides that a trial court's findings of fact
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . " "A finding of fact will be found
clearly erroneous when it is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court has a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'"
D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 354 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Cummings v.
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991)) (further citations omitted). On appeal,
an appellant must "marshall all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then
[ ] show the evidence to be legally insufficient to support the findings, even when view in
the light most favorable to the trial court." Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah
App. 1991). See also Marhsall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996); Phillips
v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App. 1995). Thus, in the present case,
Appellant must show this Court what evidence the trial court relied on to determine that
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Appellee's inheritance funds were not commingled, and then show that this finding is
against the clear weight of the evidence that the inheritance funds were in fact
commingled with marital property.

C. Evidence that Appellee Commingled his Inheritance Funds with Marital Property
The trial court found that
Petitioner [Appellee] received gifts and inheritancefromhis parent's [sic] estate and from
his parent's [sic] trust and partnership which funds were separated by him into his own
account and were used for down payment on his home in Sandy, Utah, and for down
payment and major improvement on the home of the parties in Salt Lake City, Utah and
for the purchase of Novell common stock. These funds were not commingled in any
form with marital funds or funds of Respondent.

Findings of Fact & Concl. of Law, n. 19. The court further found that
The source of the funds used was identifiable and was traceable to the investments made
which characterized the funds as separate assets of Petitioner [Appellee] and not marital
assets of the parties. The funds were not commingled and are determined to be separate
property interests of Petitioner [Appellee].
Findings of Fact & Concl. of Law, n. 20. Appellant genuinely does not understand how,
considering all of the evidence, the trial court reached these conclusions. However, since
the burden is on her to "marshall the evidence" that supports the trial court's findings, she
will do so.
1) Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings:

The inheritance funds

provided to Appellee come from the Fern F. Arnason Family Trust, which consists of
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money saved by Appellee's mother and his now-deceased father. This fact was
established through the testimony of Fern Arnason, Appellee's mother. See Record at 78,
In. 16-24. Other funds came from the Arnason Family Partnership, a partnership between
Fern Arnason and her children (including Appellee). See Record at 79, In. 16-25; 80, In.
1-16. From approximately 1982-1996, Mrs. Arnason distributed $126,100 to Appellee
from the trust and the partnership. See Record at 79, In. 1-5, 22-24; 80, In. 8-10. These
funds were given to Appellee individually, not to the parties jointly nor to Appellant. See
Record at 78, In. 16-25; 79, In. 1-3, 19-24; 80, In. 8-16.
Appellee testified that he made a $47,527 down payment on the parties' Sandy
home. These funds came from Appellee's mother's estate. See Record at 28, In. 6-11.
Appellee received these funds through checks that he deposited in his credit union
account "which was an exclusive account for [himself]." Id., In. 13-15. None of the
inheritance funds used for the down payment were earned by either of the parties. Id., In.
19-24.
The parties also owned a home in Salt Lake City. Appellee testified that "[t]he
majority of the funds [for the purchase of the house] came from my mother's estate."
Record at 31, In. 24-25; 32, In. 1-2. These funds were given to Appellee by personal
checks written to him from his mother. See id. at 32, In. 3-4. The couple made extensive
improvements to the Salt Lake City home, see Record at 31, In. 2-17, and the funds for
these improvements also came from gifts and inheritance to Appellee from his mother.
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See Record at 32, In. 17-22. The total down payment and construction costs were
$74,807. See id., In. 23-25.
Appellee also introduced evidence of income he received during the marriage from
the family partnership and the family trust. Through 1996, Appellee received $43,631
from the family partnership, which he deposited in his separate (personal) checking
account. See Record at 47, In. 10-25; 48, In. 4-18. He also received $82,469 during that
time from the family trust; the total inheritance received was $130,246, the 'Vast
majority" of which was deposited in Appellee's individual account. See Record at 49, In.
12-22.
If this had been the only evidence regarding the source and uses of Appellee's
inheritance, there might have been some basis for the trial court finding that those funds
were maintained as Appellee's separate property. However, there was a great deal of
evidence that those funds were commingled, which shows that the trial court should have
found that these funds were in fact commingled with the marital estate.
2) Evidence that Appellee's Inheritance Funds were Commingled with Marital
Funds: Appellee testified that the majority of the funds used to purchase the parties' Salt
Lake City home came from his inheritance funds. He also testified, on direct
examination, that these funds were deposited "[m]ostly in our joint checking account, me
and Beverly's [sic] joint checking account. But she, at one point, got her own checking
account and we stopped co-mingling our funds at that point." Record at 32, In. 1-9. Not
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only were these inheritance funds placed in a joint account, but Appellee admitted that the
funds were commingled with marital funds.1
Appellee deposited a portion of his paycheck into the same credit union account
that contained his inheritance funds. Funds from this account were used to make car
payments on a Buick Park Avenue. See Record at 55, In. 1-17. Appellee admitted that "I
withdrew the $400 applied towards the loan, it was a $20,000 car and I paid, it was more
like a loan that was inter-mingled with my, with my credit union savings account."
Record at 56, In. 20-23. The Buick was jointly titled in the name of Appellee and
Appellant. Record at 57, In. 10-12. The car was used for family obligations and family
matters. See id., In. 13-15. This means that funds used for marital purposes (paying for
the family car) were commingled with the inheritance funds.
As discussed above, Appellee used inheritance funds to help pay for the Sandy and
Salt Lake City homes, and improvements on the Salt Lake City home. Both Appellant
and Appellee owned these homes. See Record at 65, In. 10-14. The parties were married
when these homes were purchased, see Record at 52, In. 10-17. Appellee testified as
follows regarding the intended use of the inheritance funds:
Q:
When you indicate in your testimony that you took the moneyfromyour mother
and you kept it totally separate and you did this and you did that with it, did you do that
with the intent of keeping part of the proceeds or the value of those housesfromthe
Defendant [Appellant]?
A:
That was, you know, when you're married you don't think in those terms.
Q:
So you didn't think of that, did you?

It is also evident that Appellee's choice of wording was not accidental; that he meant the funds
had been inextricably mixed together. See Record at 40, In. 6-7 ("Well, there's been some comingling between the medical expenses and the child support.").
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A:
Intentionally, no. I kept the money sheltered so that we could get, we could use
the money instead of having it go to credit card debt.

Record at 65, In. 15-25.
Q:
When you took this money and put it into an account, it was not your intention by
paying the down payments or whatever else you paid on those houses to make those two
properties your separate property, was it?
It was my intention to provide for my family.
A
I'm going to ask you once again Q
Yes. Okay.
A
It was not you intention to make those your separate property was it?
Q
No,
it was not.
A:
Is that why her name is put on both properties?
Q
That's correct.
A:
Record at 66, In. 21-25; 67, In. 1-7.
The meaning of "commingle" is "[t]o put together in one mass; e.g., to combine
funds or properties into common fund or stock." Black's Law Dictionary (West 1990) at
271. The evidence is clear that Appellant intended to use his inheritance funds for marital
purposes, and that he did in fact commingle his inheritance funds with marital funds, then
used these commingled funds for marital purposes. A significant portion of the
inheritance funds were deposited in the parties' joint checking account, and Appellee
testified that he and his wife were commingling their money.
Appellee used commingled funds to pay for the family car; he testified that this car
was used for family purposes. Clearly, paying for the family car is a marital expense.
Similarly, paying for a house for the family to live in, and improvements to that house, are
marital expenses. Appellee used inheritance funds for these expenses. Appellee also
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testified that the reason he kept inheritance funds in a separate account was "so that we
could get, we could use the money instead of having it go to credit card debt," Record at
65, In. 23-25, and that "[i]t was my intention to provide for my family." Record at 66, In.
25. Even when viewed most favorably to the trial court's findings, the only reasonable
inference from these statements is that Appellee was intentionally using inheritance funds
to pay for marital and family expenses.
This evidence shows that marital and inheritance funds were combined into one
whole, which is what commingling means. The trial court's finding that the inheritance
funds "were not commingled in any form with marital funds," Findings of Fact and
Concl. of Law, n. 19, is clearly erroneous and against the weight of the evidence.
Because of the trial court's erroneous findings of fact on this issue, the marital estate was
given a substantially lower value than it would have received if the commingled property
had been included. This erroneous determination deprived Appellant of her equitable
share of the marital estate. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's findings
on this issue and remand the case to the trial court with an order that it enter findings
consistent with the evidence that the inheritance and marital funds were commingled.
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II.

BECAUSE APPELLEE MADE A GIFT TO THE MARITAL ESTATE OF HIS
INHERITANCE FUNDS AND PROCEEDS FROM SELLING HIS CARBON
COUNTY PROPERTY, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO INCLUDE THE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS IN ITS DIVISION
OF PROPERTY

A. Standard of Review for Division of Property
A trial court's division of property in a divorce is reviewed under an "abuse of
discretion" standard.

This court will approve changes in a trial court's property and debt distribution "only if
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."

Finlavson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that it was clearly
erroneous to find that real property was not part of marital estate when evidence showed
acts indicating an intent to give property to the couple, and couple's acts in maintaining
the property created an equitable interest) (quoting Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5
(Utah App. 1992) (further citation omitted)).
By an "abuse of discretion" . . . "is meant a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment one that is clearly against the logic and the effect of such facts as are presented in support
of the application, or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the
facts disclosed upon the hearing . . . It is a legal term to indicate that the appellate court is
of the opinion that there was a commission of error of law in the circumstances."
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State
v. Draper, 83 Utah 115, 143, 27 P.2d 39, 49-50 (1933) (further citations omitted)). When,
as here, a party claims that the trial court has abused its discretion by failing to apply the
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law or mistaking the law, this Court ureview[s] using a correction of error standard,
giving no deference to the tribunal's legal determination." Id. at 27.

B. Appellee's Inheritance Funds
In his ruling on the property division, Judge Noel stated as follows:
THE COURT:
The Courtfindsthat the intent at that time is not crucial to its
finding. I think that it would be a, it would be bad law to require that in order for
property to retain it's [sic] separateness, for example, that the, that the donee had to
intend at the time it was used that if there was a divorce he was going to claim
separateness or had to intend that it not be used for the benefit of the family. I don't think
that's the law and I don't think that that would be good law.
Record at 142, In. 19-25; 143, In. 1-3. This is both a misunderstanding and
misapplication of the law. The foreseeability of divorce is irrelevant in determining
whether separate property becomes part of the marital estate.
In addition, the cases decided by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court show that
a party's intent to use separate property for marital purposes is one of the factors courts
consider in deciding whether separate property has become marital property. In this case,
the evidence of Appellee's intent toward his supposedly "separate" property, together
with his actual use of that property, plainly shows that he made a gift of his inheritance
funds to the marital estate. See Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990)
(property considered part of the marital estate when it is inextricably commingled with
marital property or where recipient spouse has donated all or part of the property to the
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marital estate); Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 (separate property becomes marital property
"where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse").
In Mortensen, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly stated that acts showing an intent
to use one's property for marital purposes is one way that that property will be found to
be combined with the marital estate.
The rule that property acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should be awarded to
that spouse on divorce unless the other spouse has, by his or her efforts with regard to the
property, acquired an equity in it does not apply when the property thus acquired is
consumed, such as when a gift or an inheritance of money is usedfor family purposes, In
re Marriage of Metcalf, [598 P.2d 1140 (Mont. 1979)]; when the property completely
loses its identity and is not traceable because it is commingled with other property
(sometimes called transmuted)... or when the acquiring spouse places title in their joint
names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property, Hussey v.
Hussey, [312 S.E.2d 267 (S.C. App. 1984)]. See also Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk,
[325 N.W.2d 832 (Neb. 1982)]...
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307 (emphasis added). The cases relied on by the Utah Supreme
Court in adopting this rule further show that a party's intended use of property is an
important factor when deciding these issues.
In Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 325 N.W.2d 832 (Neb. 1982),, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that it was correct to include mutual fiinds given from one spouse's
father as part of the marital estate, when the evidence showed the father's intent to give
the gift to both parties. See id. at 834.
[T]he evidence is clear that the gift was to both the husband and wife. We have no way
of determining from the record that the wife's father did not intend that thefiindsbe a gift
to both parties. For that reason the trial court was correct in including the value of the
mutualfiindsin the marital estate.
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Id. Similarly, in Hussev v. Hussey, 312 S.E.2d 267 (S.C. App. 1984), also relied on by
the Mortensen court, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina remanded a divorce case for
further findings to determine whether certain inherited property of one spouse had
become marital property. See id. at 271. The court stated that
where the nonmarital character of inherited property is lost, it may be equitably divided.
This may occur when the property becomes so commingled as to be untraceable; is
utilized by the parties in support of the marriage; or is titled jointly or otherwise utilized
in such a way as to evidence an intent by the parties to make it marital property.

Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions also consistently look at a party's
intent to determine whether the intended use made separate property become marital.
See, e£., Huerta v. Huerta, 896 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Idaho App. 1995) (affirming property
division when it was found that parties had agreed that real property would become
"community" property during the marriage); In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 332
(Colo. App. 1996) ("If one spouse causes title to be placed in the joint names of both, a
gift is presumed, and the burden to show otherwise is upon the donor."); In re Marriage of
Meisner, 715 P.2d 1273 (Colo. App. 1985) (where husband intended to make joint
investment with wife, property was correctly considered to be marital property); Gardner
v. Harris, 923 P.2d 96, 99 (Alaska 1996) ("[I]t is a well-settled principle that property
acquired before marriage 'can become marital property where that is the intent of the
owner and there is an act or acts which demonstrate that intent.").
This Court has also considered parties' intended use of gifts, inheritances, or
premarital property when facing the issue of when such property becomes part of the
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marital estate. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah App. 1990) (agreeing with
wife's argument that "property should have been characterized as marital property
because its separate identity was lost through commingling, exchanges or by [husband's]
conduct evidencing an intention to treat the property or its proceeds as marital property.");
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 535-36 (Utah App. 1990) (affirming trial
court's finding that cash gifts were part of marital estate when the evidence showed that
"the cash gifts were intended for both parties"); Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843,
849-50 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that it was clearly erroneous to find that real property
was not part of marital estate when evidence showed acts indicating an intent to give
property to the couple, and couple's acts in maintaining the property creating equitable
interest).
In the present case, the evidence presented to the trial court shows that Appellee
intentionally used his inheritance funds for family and marital purposes;
1.

Appellee commingled his salary and inheritance funds into a credit union

checking account, which he used to pay for marital expenses, such as the family car.
Record at 56, In. 20-23; 57, In. 10-12, 13-15.
2.

The family homes, which were jointly titled in the parties' names, were

purchased and improved with Appellee's inheritance funds. Record at 28, In. 6-11; 31,
In. 2-17, 24-25; 32, In. 1-4, 17-22.
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3.

Appellee testified that he did not intend to keep the proceeds or value of the

homes he purchased with inheritance funds separate from the marital estate. Record at
65, In. 15-23; 67, In. 3-5.
4.

Appellee also testified that he kept the inheritance funds in a separate

account so that they could be used for family purposes (".. .so that we could get, we could
use the money . . . " ) . Id., In. 23-24 (emphasis added).
5.

When questioned about his reasons for using his inheritance funds for these

expenses, Appellee testified, "It was my intention to provide for my family." Record at
66, In. 25.
This evidence plainly shows that Appellee made a gift of his inheritance funds to
the marital estate. As the case law discussed above shows, Appellee's intent in using his
inheritance funds for these purposes is highly relevant, and perhaps sometimes
determinative, in finding that a spouse's inheritance has become part of the marital estate.
The evidence of Appellee's intent was unequivocal and undisputed. However, for
reasons unknown to Appellant, the trial court totally disregarded the evidence concerning
Appellee's intent. See Record at 142. In. 19-25; 143, In. 1-3. The trial court's failure to
consider this evidence was an error of law, to which this Court gives no deference. See
Tolman, 818P.2dat27.
The trial court's failure to make an equitable division of the marital property was a
further abuse of its discretion. "Each party [in a divorce action] is presumed to be entitled
to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Burt v.
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Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172. As this Court has explained, "under Burt, once a court makes a
finding that a specific item is marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared
equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate
findings, require otherwise." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993)
(holding that trial court abused its discretion in unequally dividing property without any
factual finding justifying the inequity).
In this case, the trial court made no findings of unusual circumstances regarding
the property division. Therefore, Appellant should have been awarded half the value of
the marital estate. The Mortensen rule is clear that when inheritance funds are
commingled into the marital estate or otherwise become marital property, those funds are
to be equitably divided just as any other marital property. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at
308. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's finding that Appellee's intent
in using his inheritance funds is not determinative, and order the trial court to enter
findings consistent with the facts presented to it. Additionally, this Court should reverse
the trial court's division of property, and order the trial court to include the value of
Appellee's inheritance funds in determining the value of the marital estaite and make an
equitable division of that value.

C. Appellee's Carbon County Home
The trial court also abused its discretion by failing to include the value of
Appellee's premarital home in Carbon County as part of the marital estate. The proceeds
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from the sale of this property were a gift by Appellee to the marital estate, and were
consumed for family and marital purposes. Thus, these proceeds became marital
property.
Appellee acquired the Carbon County home in the 1970's, prior to his marriage to
Appellant, and lived in it until 1983. Record at 29, In. 5-6. In 1996, Appellant sold this
home for $21,000. Id-, In. 11-12. Appellee used $20,000 from the proceeds of this sale
to pay the mortgage on the parties' family home in Sandy. Id., In. 13-15. He used the
other $1,000 "for just [sic] expenses of the household." Record at 70, In. 25; 71, In. 1.
The trial court found that these proceeds were "separate property of [Appellee] and
are not marital property." Findings of Fact and Concl. of Law, n. 21. Because this
finding is contrary to established law, the trial court abused its discretion and must be
reversed.
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), this Court addressed similar
issues involving proceeds from the sale of a spouse's premarital property. There, the
husband owned a condominium purchased before the marriage. He sold the
condominium, using part of the proceeds from the sale for a down payment on the
couple's marital home, and the rest for a promissory note payable to the couple. See id. at
1321. This Court held that "[p]remarital property was consumed and its identification
lost through commingling and exchanges . . . Premarital property may lose its separate
distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital estate or
where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate" Id.
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(emphasis added). This Court reversed the trial court's property division and ordered the
lower court to include the value of this premarital property with the marital estate. Id.
As in Dunn, in this case the proceeds from the sale of Appellee's premarital
property were used for payment on the marital home and for other marital expenses.
Therefore, the proceeds lost their distinction as Appellee's separate property, and became
part of the marital estate. The trial court disregarded the guidelines set by this Court and
failed to include the value of these proceeds with the total value of the marital estate.
This was an abuse of discretion. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's findings
on this issue and order it to include the value of the proceeds from Appellee's Carbon
County property as part of the marital estate.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's erroneous findings of fact and misapplication of the law resulted
in substantial and unfairly prejudicial harm to Appellant. Because the trial court failed to
consider the clear evidence that Appellee commingled his inheritance funds with the
marital estate, as well as the evidence that Appellee used proceeds from selling his
Carbon County home for marital expenses, the marital estate was undervalued by over
$150,000. Under Utah law, Appellant is presumed to be entitled to half of this value,
because it was part of the marital estate.
Although trial courts have considerable discretion in divorce actions, they do not
have the discretion to ignore the rules of law determined by this Court and the Supreme
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Court of Utah. In the present case, the trial court did just that. The failure of the trial
court to correctly apply the law in this case caused an unjust result for Appellant.
Wherefore, Appellant respectfully urges this Court to grant her the following
relief:
1.

To reverse the trial court's findings of fact that Appellee's inheritance funds

were not commingled with the marital estate, and to order the trial court to enter findings
consistent with the evidence presented on this issue;
2.

To reverse the trial court's distribution of property, and order the trial court

to make an equitable division of the marital estate that includes the value of Appellee's
commingled inheritance funds;
3.

To reverse the trial court's finding that the proceeds from Appellee's

Carbon County are separate property, and to order the trial court to include the value of
these proceeds when determining and equitably dividing the value of the marital estate;
4.

To award to Appellant her costs in making this appeal, pursuant to Utah R.

App. Proc. 34(a), and for any other relief that this Court finds to be appropriate.
Dated December 3, 1999.

i2MLM^—
V

Attorney for Appellant Beverly Sue Arnason
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANTHONY DAVID ARNASON,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)

BEVERLY SUE ARNASON,

)

No. 974901978DA

)

Judge Frank G. Noel

Respondent.

This matter came for trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge,
presiding on April 19, 1999. The parties were present and were represented by their legal
counsel of record. More than ninety days have passed since the filing of the Complaint herein.
The parties have complied with the statutory requirements of attendance at parenting class and
of providing verification of income and filing child support worksheets. The parties presented
testimony and evidence. Legal counsel for the parties presented argument as to issues of law
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and fact, and the court, having reviewed all pleadings, the evidence, testimony and the law
presented and being fully advised now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent are and for more than three months prior to the

filing of this Complaint have been actual and bona fide residents of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
2.

The parties hereto are husband and wife, having been married in Salt Lake

City, Utah on August 26,1983.
3.

There have been three children born as issue of this marriage, Andrea

Amason, born August 7,1984, now age 14, Cassandra Arnason, born November 9,1987, now
age 11, and Troy Alexander Amason, born August 26,1990, now age 8.
4.

For many months prior to the separation of the parties in April, 1997, the

parties have experienced many differences, which have become irreconcilable, including
Respondent commencing a relationship with another man. There are good and sufficient
grounds for granting of divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
5.

Petitioner is a fit and proper person and should be awarded the legal care,

custody and control of the three minor children, Petitioner should be awarded possessory
custody of Andrea and Troy and Petitioner should be their primary care provider. The parties
should be awarded joint possessory custody of Cassandra, The child should be in the custody of
Respondent overnight and in the custody of Petitioner during the day except for the statutory
visitation periods.
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Respondent should be awarded reasonable visitation with the minor children

and should have at least statutory minimum visitation rights as provided in Sections 30-3-35,
U.C., 1997, and additional visitation as the children and the parties may agree and as may be in
the best interests of the children. In addition to joint possessory custody of Cassandra,
Petitioner should be awarded statutory visitation rights with Cassandra as to weekday evenings,
weekends, holidays, special holidays and extended summer visitation periods.
7.

The Statutory Advisory Guidelines, Section 30-3-33 U.C, 1997, and the

provisions for special circumstances, Section 30-3-36 U.C 1997, and the provisions as to
relocation, Section 30-3-37 U.C, 1997, should apply. Copies of these statutes are attached for
assistance of the parties.)
8.

The Court specifically finds that the parties arc equally bonded to the minor

children, that Petitioner has been the primary care provider for the three minor children for the
past two years since the separation of the parties, that Petitioner can provide a more stable
environment for the children in that Respondent maintains a relationship with a man outside of
marriage and has demonstrated a use and acquiescence to the use of marijuana which is not a
proper environment for the minor children. The Court also finds that the minor child,
Cassandra, has resided half time with Respondent since October, 1998 and that this arrangement
has been satisfactory for the child. However, Petitioner should remain the responsible party for
continuing clinical psychiatric care for Cassandra and for the continuing of prescribed
medication. Petitioner should also continue as the responsible party for the schooling of
Cassandra, either under the present home school program or in private or pubic school.
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Petitioner should consult with Respondent as to the education and medical decisions concerning
Cassandra.
9.

Based upon the child support work sheets attached hereto, Respondent

should pay child support of $605.00 per month for the support of Andrea and Troy and $7.00
per month for the support of Cassandra and $75 per month as one-half of medical insurance
premiums for the three minor children totaling child support of $687.00 per month commencing
April 19,1999 and continuing thereafter until each child reaches 18 years of age, is emancipated
or graduates from high school in the normal course whichever should occur later.
10.

Child support of $687.00 per month should be paid pursuant to the statutory

child support guidelines and based on the income of the parties set forth in the child support
worksheet filed herein. One half of child support shall be due by the 5* and one half by the 20th
of each month.
11.

The parties have equitably divided their personal property, furniture and

furnishings including the furnishings and furniture of the minor children, and each should be
awarded the personal property now in their possession as their sole and separate property.
12.

Petitioner should be awarded his 1988 Buick Park Avenue automobile and

he should be awarded his personal belongings as his sole and separate property.
13.

Each party should pay their own debts and obligations incurred in their own

name and should hold the other party harmless therefrom.
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14.

Neither party should be awarded alimony herein. Both parties are fully

capable of providing for their own needs. Respondent's admitted cohabitation since separation
would foreclose any claim for alimony.
15.

Petitioner should maintain health and accident insurance for the minor

children. Each party pay one-half of the actual medical insurance premiums, co-pay and
medical, dental, orthodontic and eye care expenses for the minor children not covered by
insurance.
16.

Petitioner waives any interest, right or claim to any of the employment

claims of Respondent filed through the office of equal employment opportunity or through her
employer.
17.

The parties waive the requirement of income withholding and respondent

should pay the child support directly to petitioner until further order of the Court.
18.

Petitioner and Respondent should maintain their own life insurance policies

with the minor children of the parties as named beneficiaries thereof.
19.

The Court finds that Petitioner received gifts and inheritance from his

parent's estate and from his parent's trust and partnership which funds were separated by him
into his own account and were used for down payment on his home in Sandy, Utah, and for
down payment and major improvement on the home of the parties in Salt Lake City, Utah and
for the purchase of Novell common stock. These funds were not commingled in any form with
marital funds or funds of Respondent.

20. Respondent's claim as to the intent of Petitioner at the time the ftinds were
invested in the two properties and the stock is not determinative in this proceeding. The source
of the funds used was identifiable and was traceable to the investments made which
characterized the funds as separate assets of Petitioner and not marital assets; of the parties. The
funds were not commingled and are determined to be separate property interests of Petitioner.
21.

Petitioner received $20,000 in the sale of his premarital property located in

Carbon County, Utah, which funds were used to pay down the principal due on the mortgage of
the Sandy, Utah home which funds are found to be separate property of Petitioner and are not
marital property.
22.

The real and personal property of the parties should be divided equitably

pursuant to Exhibit P-8 which follows:

Asset
1) Sandy Home awarded to
Petitioner
Appraised
Mortgage, $853.37 per month
Separate Down (Husband)
2) Salt Lake Home awarded to
Respondent
Appraised
Mortgage, $417.80 per month
Separate Down (Husband)

Marital Equity

205,000.00
(112,256.00)
( 47,527.00)
( 20,000.00)

Awarded to
Petitioner

25,217.00

130,000.00
(14,864.00)
(74,807.00)

3) 401k Retirement

84,076.00

4) 401k Retirement

48,233.00

Awarded to
Respondent

40,329.00
74,807.00
84,076.00
48,233.00

6,000.00

5) IRA (Marital)

Novell stock

6) Stock Holdings (Novell)
Inheritance, Separate property
of Petitioner

1,800.00

7) 1988 Buick Park Avenue

Minimum

8) Personal Property

1,800.00
12.000.00
129,093.00

TOTALS
Difference

2.000.00
165, 369.00

36,276.00
18,138.00

V4 from Wife
Division

23.

6,000.00

147,231.00

(18,138.00)
147.231.00

Petitioner is awarded judgment against Respondent and an equitable lien

against the Salt Lake City home in the amount of $92,945.00 being $74,807.00 as Petitioner's
separate interest in the home and $18,138.00 as the amount necessaiy to equalize the division of
assets between the parties. Judgment shall not accrue interest until the amount is due.
Respondent shall pay the amount of the judgment to Petitioner at the first occurrence of one of
the following events:
A. the minor child Cassandra is emancipated or reaches 18 years of age;
B. the home is sold;
C. the home is no longer used as Respondent's principal place of
residence;

D. Respondent remarries;
E. Respondent cohabits with a person of the opposite sex.
After the date of occurrence of one of the above events, this judgment should accrue interest at
the legal rate until paid.
24.

Petitioner should be awarded additional judgment against Respondent for

$2,545.16 for temporary child support aiTearages, medical insurance premiums due and medical
expenses of the minor children due through April 19, 1999.
25.

Petitioner's claim for lost rent on the Salt Lake City home is denied.

26.

The parties should cooperate in the execution of the documents, deeds,

conveyances or transfers necessary to effectuate the division of assets between the parties as set
forth herein.
27.

Each party should pay their own attorneys' fees and costs involved in this

28.

Petitioner should claim the oldest and youngest children as dependents for

proceeding.

income tax purposes. Respondent should claim the middle child as a dependent for income tax
purposes.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and for good cause appearing, upon
motion of plaintiff s counsel, the Court makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over

the parties and the minor children to this action.

2.

The parties have completed the required parenting class. (Certificates of

Completion arefiledherein.
3.

The parties have filed the required verification of income.

4.

Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce from Respondent upon

the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and absolute upon signing
and filing of the same in the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk.
5.

The Decree of Divorce granted to Petitioner should be in conformance

with the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this

y

/^J day of [VlA/lsl

. 1999.

BY THE COURT:

District Judge
Approved as to Form:

'p^vid Pauf
Attorney for Respondent
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANTHONY DAVID ARNASON,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
No. 974901978DA
vs.
Judge Frank G. Noel
BEVERLY SUE ARNASON,
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS

Defendant.

DATE

t-M-W

This matter having come for trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge
presiding on April 19, 1999. This Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and all statutory requirements as to the parenting class, verification of income and child
support having been met, the Court having been fully advised now makes and enters the
following:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving his marriage to

Respondent, the same to becomefinaland absolute upon signing andfilinghereof in the office
of the Salt Lake County Clerk of Court.
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2.

Petitioner shall be awarded the legal care, custody and control of the minor children

of the parties: Andrea Arnason, Cassandra Arnason, and Troy Alexander Arnason. Petitioner
shall be awarded possessory custody of Andrea and Troy with Respondent having rights of
visitation. The parties shall have joint possessory custody of Cassandra as provided in the
Findings of the Court, and Petitioner shall have statutory visitation rights in addition to daytime
possessory custody.
3.

Respondent shall be awarded liberal and reasonable visitation with the children and

shall have at least statutory minimum visitation rights as provided in Sections 30-3-35.5 and 303-35 U.C, 1997, and additional visitation as the children and the parties may agree aind as may
be in the best interests of the child.
4.

The Statutory Advisory Guidelines, Section 30-3-33 U.C, 1997, and the provisions

for special circumstances, Section 30-3-36 U.C. 1997, and the provisions as to relocation,
Section 30-3-37 U.C, 1997, shall apply.
5.

Child support of $687.00 per month shall be paid pursuant to the statutory child

support guidelines commencing April 19, 1999 and continuing each month thereafter.
6.

The parties shall each be awarded the personal property now in their possession as

their sole and separate property.
7.

Petitioner should be awarded his 1988 Buick Park Avenue automobile and he

should be awarded his personal belongings as his sole and separate property.
8.

Each party should pay their own debts and obligations incurred in their own name

and should hold the other party harmless therefrom.
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9.

Neither party should be awarded alimony herein. Both parties are fully capable of

providing for their own needs.
10. Petitioner should maintain health and accident insurance for the minor children.
Each party shall pay one-half of the actual medical insurance premiums, co-pay and medical,
dental, orthodontic and eye care expenses for the minor children not covered by insurance.
11. Petitioner waives any interest, right or claim to any of the employment claims of
Respondent filed through the office of equal employment opportunity or through her employer.
12. The parties waive the requirement of income withholding and respondent should
pay the child support directly to petitioner until further order of the Court.
13. Petitioner and Respondent should maintain their own life insurance policies with
the minor children of the parties as named beneficiaries thereof.
14. The real and personal property of the parties should be divided equitably pursuant to
Exhibit P-8 which follows.
15.

Petitioner is awarded judgment against Respondent and an equitable lien against the

Salt Lake City home in the amount of $92,945.00 being $74,807.00 as Petitioner's separate
interest in the home and $18,138.00 as the amount necessary to equalize the division of assets
between the parties. This judgment shall not accrue interest until the amount is due.
Respondent shall pay the amount of the judgment to Petitioner at the first occurrence of one *>f
the following events:
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A.

the minor child Cassandra is emancipated or reaches 18 years of age;

B.

the home is sold;

C.

the home is no longer used as Respondent's principal place of residence;
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D.

Respondent remarries;

E.

Respondent cohabits with a person of the opposite sex.

After the date of occurrence of one of the above events, this judgment shall accrue interest at the
legal rate until paid.
16.

Petitioner shall be awarded judgment against Respondent for $2,545.16 for

temporary child support arrearages, medical insurance premiums due and medical expenses of
the minor children due through April 19,1999.
17.

Petitioner's claim for lost rent on the Salt Lake City home is denied.

18.

The parties shall cooperate in the execution of documents, deeds, conveyances or

transfers necessary to effectuate the division of assets between the parties as set forth herein.
19.

Each party should pay their own attorneys' fees and costs involved in this

proceeding.
20.

Petitioner may claim the oldest and youngest children as dependents for income tax

purposes. Respondent may claim the middle child as a dependent for income tax purposes.
DATED this

M

day of

\V[/il/l

, 1999.
BY THE COURT/''I

\

^

\

District Judge
^ A ^ H J ^
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Approved as to Form:

David Paul White
Attorney for"Respondent
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DAVID PAUL WHITE, #3441
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
5278 South Pinemont Drive,
Suite A-200
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801)266-4114
W

THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
—oooOooo—
)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

BEVERLY SUE ARNASON,
)

Defendant and Appellant,

)

vs.
ANTHONY DAW) ARNASON
Plaintiff and Appellee.

)

Trial Court No. 974901978 DA

)

Trial Judge Frank G.Noel

—oooOooo—
Notice is hereby given that the Defendant and Appdlant, Beveriy Sue Amason, appeals to the
or
Utah Court of Appeals thefinaljud^ent of the Honorable FrankNoel, entered in this matter on
about May 19, 1999.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment and from all proceedings.
DATED this J 7 _ day of June, 1999.

Davicf Paul
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL
f i2
to be mailed, postage prepaid, June 7'rf±', 1999, to the following party at the address indicated
below:
M. Byron Fisher, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
PO BOX 510210
Salt Lake City, UT 84151

2

